PUBLIC POLICIES IN CRISISCONTEXTS: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE FORMULATION OF ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRAZIL IN 2008 AND 2020

POLÍTICAS PÚBLICAS EM CONTEXTOS DE CRISE: UMA ANÁLISE COMPARADA DA FORMULAÇÃO DAS POLÍTICAS ECONÔMICAS

Abstract
This article presents a comparative analysis of the setting of the agenda and formulation of public policies in Brazil in response to the financial crisis of 2008 and the health crisis of 2020. The objective is to verify to what measure the existence of these crises, their nature, the economic context and the propensity of the government to intervene in the economy influence the process of formulating public policies to deal with the crises’ consequences. For this purpose, we compare the emergency policies established by the federal government executive and legislative branches in the six months after the start of each crisis in Brazil. The results indicate that in 2008, most of the policies adopted originated from existing policies and programs and were transitory, with the exceptions of the Minha Casa Minha Vida (“My Home My Life”) program and tax relief measures. Besides this, the reactions were more centralized in the executive. In turn, in 2020 the most important policies were new (Program to Maintain Employment and Income and Emergency Relief Program), although also temporary, with a contradictory stance of the executive and active participation of Congress.


Resumo

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Este artigo realiza uma análise comparada da entrada na agenda e da formulação das políticas públicas no Brasil como resposta aos efeitos da crise financeira de 2008 e da crise sanitária de 2020. O objetivo é verificar em que medida a existência de uma crise, sua natureza, o contexto econômico e a propensão do governo em intervir na economia influenciam o processo de formulação das políticas públicas para lidar com as suas consequências. A metodologia utilizada é a análise comparada das políticas públicas econômicas emergenciais formuladas para lidar com os efeitos das crises de 2008 e 2020. Nosso enfoque é o governo federal (Executivo e Legislativo) e o período é de seis meses após a chegada das crises ao Brasil. O resultado do artigo indica que, em 2008, a maior parte das políticas formuladas teve origem em políticas já existentes e foram transitórias, com exceção do Minha Casa Minha Vida e as desonerações. Além disso, houve uma ação mais centralizada do Executivo. Já em 2020, as políticas mais importantes foram novas (Programa de Manutenção do Emprego e da Renda e Auxílio Emergencial) e de caráter transitório, com incorporação contraditória do Executivo e uma participação ativa do Legislativo.


Introduction

In December 2019, the first human cases were reported of COVID-19, caused by the new coronavirus, in Wuhan, China. (WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, 2020). After this, COVID-19 quickly spread throughout the world, claiming its first victims in Brazil in March 2020. The number of cases and the death toll increased rapidly, putting the pandemic at the center of the national debate, focusing on its economic and social consequences.

At a moment when the ongoing COVID-19 crisis still raises doubts, the parallels are inevitable with other sanitary crises (e.g., the Spanish Flu of 1918) or economic crises (such as in 1929 and 2008). The latter of these two is the focus of our investigation. The financial crisis of 2008 is considered by many observers to be the most severe since the Great Depression triggered by the stock market crash of 1929 (FOSTER & MAGDOFF, 2009). Its origin was the bursting of a bubble in the American real estate market and the interaction with a series of “innovative” financial instruments (such as the mortgage-backed securities) in which the real risks were masked. While the bubble was expanding, companies had ceased following their risk management protocols and regulators did little or nothing to restrict economic agents from assuming excessive risks (BAILY, LITAN & JOHNSON, 2008).

The focus of this article is on the formulation of public policies to deal with the economic crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic and the importance of the government in these contexts. Our interest is not the policies implemented in response to the crises per se (from the financial standpoint in the first case and the sanitary and economic perspectives in the second). More specifically, we examine the backdrop of existing programs and instruments, the new programs implemented to deal with the effects of the crises, the actions of different actors (from the executive and legislative branches) and the spaces available for consolidation of the agenda and formulation in an autarchic or associative perspective.

As will be presented here, although quite different, the two crises have some similarities. Among these, both demonstrated high contagion power. In other words, after arising in the United States (2008) and China (2019), both spread rapidly throughout the world, including Brazil. Moreover, it is interesting to note that the word “contagion” is used both to describe the direct or indirect spread of diseases (2020) and of financial meltdowns (2008). In other words, the use of this term in both crises is another element of similarity between them.

In this sense, the objective of this article is to verify to what extent the existence of these crises, their nature, economic context and propensity of the government to intervene in the economy influence the process of formulating public policies to deal with its consequences.

The method used is comparative analysis of the emergency public policies formulated and implemented in reaction to the crises of 2008 and 2020. Our focus is on the federal government (executive and legislative branches) during the first six months after the start of each crisis in Brazil. The choice of the federal government is justified by its monopoly on monetary policy and preeminence in fiscal policy in comparison with the subnational governments. The theoretical
framework applied is based on the literature on crises and public policies and encompassed analysis of the public economic policies formulated to deal with both crises. The data covered the periods before and after each crisis, to contextualize the situation and describe the actions taken in the ensuing months. The data sources were the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE), National Treasury and Brazilian Central Bank.

The article is divided into six sections including this introduction. In the second section we characterize the crisis of 2008 and COVID-19 pandemic as “modern crises” and describe how crises influence the agenda for action and formulation of public policies. The third section describes the context of the 2008 crisis in Brazil and the main policies formulated to deal with its consequences. In the fourth section we present the context of the crisis of 2020 caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the policies formulated to face its effects. The fifth section presents a comparison between the two moments, and the last section presents our final considerations.

Crisis, agenda for action and formulation of public policies

Although very different from each other, the effects of the global financial turbulence of 2008 and of the COVID-19 pandemic of 2020 can be classified as crises3, to which the Brazilian government reacted (in the first case) and is still reacting (in the second).

To theoretically approximate these two crises, we relied on the ideal type of modern crises as transboundary crises formulated by Boin (2009). In this sense, the expression transboundary crisis is used when the “functioning of multiple, life-sustaining systems, functions, or infrastructures is acutely threatened and the causes of failure or courses of redress remain unclear.” (BOIN, 2009, p. 368). The author claims that his definition is consistent with the traditional vision about crises, which has as the main conceptual elements threat, urgency and uncertainty (BOIN, 2009). However, a fundamental difference is the capacity of these modern crises to cross boundaries of different types. Therefore, they cross geographic borders, functional boundaries (of economic sectors or from the public to the private sector and vice versa) and time boundaries (they cannot be located easily in time, i.e., it is hard to determine when they start and end) (BOIN, 2009).

It is possible to characterize the two crises at issue here as transboundary, since both began in specific countries and/or regions and crossed geographic boundaries to spread around the world, including Brazil. Likewise, they crossed functional boundaries. The 2008 crisis went from the private sector to the public sector and from the financial sector to the “real economy”. In turn, the COVID-19 crisis started as a health crisis and rapidly crossed the boundary to become an economic crisis. Finally, they both crossed time boundaries, making it difficult to locate them in time. It is impossible to understand the 2008 crisis without comprehending the financial liberalization movements that happened in previous years. Also, its effects were felt for many years afterward. Likewise, the sanitary crisis needs to be understood against a backdrop of environmental and productive changes resulting from the greater flow of capital and people on the planet. In this case, it is important to note that during the writing of this article, the end of the 2020 crisis appears distant. Therefore, it would be foolish to make any type of prediction about the duration of the effects of this crisis. In any event, the combination of the crossing of these boundaries (geographic, functional and time) has created “power vacuums” that hinder the definition of who is responsible for leading efforts to deal with them. These power vacuums have generated tensions between different actors: nations and international bodies; central and local authorities; public organizations and private interests, etc. These aspects make transboundary crises especially hard to manage (BOIN, 2009).

Crisis tends to impact the entire cycle of public policies. From the standpoint of the agenda, it is fitting to use the multiple streams framework of Kingdon (2005), in which the agenda is defined.

3 Besides crisis, the use is common of other terms, such as catastrophe and disaster. The difference between a crisis and disaster can be described according to Birkland (2006): crises tend to be caused by actions (or inactions) of an organization, while disasters are caused by natural phenomena or human actions outside of organizations (such as terrorist acts). Finally, catastrophes are similar to disasters, but generally are much worse, with deeper and broader effects (BIRKLAND, 2006). Based on these concepts and from the perspective of Brazil, the economic crisis of 2008 and the COVID-19 pandemic can both be classified as disasters because they were outside the control of the Brazilian government and were caused by external factors. Nevertheless, as advocated by Birkland (2006), besides being generated internally, crises can also be the result of a disaster or any other undesired event that threatens to overwhelm the adaptive capacity of an organization (such as a government). In other words, although outside the control of the Brazilian government, both events generated consequences to the country’s citizens and organizations; and hence required actions by the government to eliminate or minimize those consequences. It is in this sense that both events can be characterized as crises from the Brazilian perspective.
by three independent streams: problems, policies and politics. From the standpoint of the flow of problems, for a theme to enter the agenda it must be considered a problem. This can happen in various ways, but Kingdon (2005) cites the need of a focusing event, which includes crises and disasters, among other factors. Therefore, crises like the financial meltdown of 2008 and the current COVID-19 pandemic have economic consequences that rapidly enter the category of problems.

From the viewpoint of public policies, Kingdon (2005) contends that they are the result of a long process of generation of ideas, recombinations, mutations and analyses (from the perspective of political support and from the logical and analytic standpoint). It can be argued that this long process is usually already under way before a crisis happens, but it is certainly accelerated by the crisis and its consequences.

Crisis can also impact the political stream. While on the one hand the Brazilian governments confronting the crises of 2008 and 2020 had distinct, even opposite, ideologies (in 2008, the executive branch had a greater propensity for intervening in the economy, while in 2020 the participation of Congress has also been important against the backdrop of an executive less eager to intervene in the economy – an issue that will be examined further ahead). In any event, according to Kingdon (2005), besides the politicians elected and the ideological and political distributions in the National Congress, another aspect that impacts the political stream is the national mood. And this aspect is strongly affected by crises like those analyzed here, since both rapidly generated economic losses to individuals and companies (besides the health impact of COVID-19).

Therefore, it appears clear that crises have the potential to influence the streams (of problems, policies and politics). More importantly, they have the ability, as described by Kingdon (2005), to create windows of opportunity and for the three streams to converge, putting the theme firmly on the agenda for decisions.

From the standpoint of formulation of public policies to deal with crises and their consequences, the literature generally presents them as opportunities for policy changes, or at least situations conducive to them. For example, Hogan and Feeney (2012) advocate that public policy changes in the political science literature have been understood via the concept of exogenous shocks. However, according to the authors, this literature has not been concerned about analyzing by what mechanisms crises generate public policy changes. The hypothesis they present in their article is that in the context of an exogenous shock (they use the British crisis of 1979), the political entrepreneurs are the main agents responsible for the changes in public policies. Therefore, a crisis may or may not generate changes in public policies. The authors’ main point is that the existence of a crisis does not guarantee a change in public policies (HOGAN & FEENEY, 2012).

Associated with the idea of political entrepreneurs, according to Boin and ’T Hart (2003), in light of the characteristics of modern crises, the expectations about the actions of public leaders are impossible to fulfill. They further argue that the expectation that crises are opportunities for huge reforms is unrealistic. For them, the best practices for managing crises are distinct from the requirements to produce drastic reforms. Indeed, trying to undertake large reforms during times of crisis is dangerous (BOIN & ’T HART, 2003).

In a similar vein, Ronconi et al. (2010) discuss whether the policies formulated by Latin American countries to deal with the 2008 financial crisis were only short-term patches or if the crisis was interpreted as a window of opportunity to promote more lasting structural changes.

In other words, the discussion involves to what extent the policies formulated after the start of a crisis are crafted to deal with its effects or if the crisis only provides an opportunity to formulate policies that the government already intended to implement, only lacking an opportunity to do so. It is possible to connect this discussion with the point addressed by Cohen, March and Olsen (1972) in their seminal article: solutions looking for problems to which they could be the answer.

Finally, another interesting point, raised by Ronconi et al. (2010), is that the process of formulating public policies itself can undergo alterations in crisis moments. Therefore, crises can change the structure of incentives, winding up changing the relative weights of actors in the formulation process. For example, different weights can be attributed to more centralized actions (such as those determined by the president) as opposed to those that depend on collegial actions (such as by Congress).

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6 They define political entrepreneurs as agents that form the bridge between new public policy ideas (policy entrepreneurs) and the institutions which implement them. In other words, at moments of external shocks, policy entrepreneurs produce new ideas, and then the political entrepreneurs introduce these ideas in the process of formulating public policies (HOGAN & FEENEY, 2012).
The 2008 financial crisis and the formulation of public policies

The performance of the Brazilian economy at the start of the 21st century, after the brief turbulence in the transition from the second term of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso to the first term of President Lula da Silva, was marked by internal and external expansion, as was the case of other Latin American economies, dubbed the “Onda Rosa” (“Pink Tide”) (SILVA, 2015), which greatly favored the project of the new government under the leadership of the Partido dos Trabalhadores (“Workers Party”) (PT). On the external side, the trade balance began to increase in 2002 and continued on an upward path, allowing accumulation of international reserves and generating expansive internal effects that increased tax revenues, leading to successive primary surpluses. As can be seen in Table 1, starting in 2004, GDP growth consistently exceeded 3% a year, with the highlights being 2007 and 2008, along with reduction of the unemployment rate, which fell significantly below the average of 10% during the previous period. Inflation, which briefly spiked upward in the transition between the presidencies, converged to the target established by the Central Bank, except a fleeting acceleration in 2008. Finally, the good performance regarding the gross debt and primary surplus consolidated the perception of greater freedom to exercise an economic policy involving higher mobilization of government resources.

Table 1: Evolution of selected indicators for Brazil (2001-2008)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>2001</th>
<th>2002</th>
<th>2003</th>
<th>2004</th>
<th>2005</th>
<th>2006</th>
<th>2007</th>
<th>2008</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (%)</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>10.2</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
<td>7.7</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP (%)</td>
<td>18.4</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>17.4</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>17.3</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>19.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Debt/GDP (%)</td>
<td>67.3</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>71.5</td>
<td>68.0</td>
<td>67.0</td>
<td>64.6</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Surplus/GDP (%)</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Sources: IBGE, National Treasury, Central Bank.

The interpretation that the crisis was focalized induced the government to carry out focalized interventions to face it, by implementing a repertoire of known policies (AFONSO, 2010). In the context of global shortage of dollars, reflecting the protective reactions of national economies, Brazil’s currency depreciated sharply between October 2008 and April 2009, aggravated by an existing trend for lower commodity prices. The IPCA (Comprehensive Consumer Price Index), which had been consistently high in the first half of 2008, declined markedly in the fourth quarter. The emergency measures can be viewed from two perspectives, focusing on monetary policy and fiscal policy, as analyzed next.

On the monetary side, the Brazilian Central Bank (BCB), based on early warning signs of the crisis that began to appear in 2007, resorted to two actions in January 2008 to maintain convergence of inflation to the target, via the traditional mechanism of adjusting the benchmark interest rate and by increasing the reserve requirement of banks. This last measure aimed to preserve a security cushion against speculative attacks on the private financial system. The measures implemented by the BCB during the entire crisis had four guidelines: (a) shielding the macroeconomic “tripod”; (b) reducing the exposure of the BCB to the financial repercussions of erroneous decisions by the private

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7 According to Singer (2012), until the crisis of 2008 it is possible to identify two phases of the Lula administration. Between 2003 and 2005, approximation with neoliberal economic policies prevailed, along with expansion of income transfers (Bolsa Família program), credit (via authorization for banks to make payroll loans, with lower interest rates due to automatic repayment via deduction from salary or pension benefits) and earnings (increase of the minimum monthly wage). The second phase, which ended with the 2008 crisis, started with the arrival of Guido Mantega as minister of finance in 2006, was marked by the characteristics described above and the Growth Acceleration Program (PAC). These three points – redistribution of income, greater access to credit and increased public investments – are also identified by Carvalho (2018) as the “Brazilian Little Miracle” (milagre econômico). Further according to her, until then a plan for intervention of the State directly in the internal market had been designed. Starting in 2011, a strategy emerged of incentives to the private sector, through fiscal, monetary and credit measures, a change that cannot be associated with the management of the financial crisis of 2008.

8 In 2009 the Senate established a committee to monitor the financial crisis, with the added objectives of accompanying the volume of credit transactions, bank spreads and interest rates (SENADO FEDERAL, 2010). A similar committee was established by the House of Representatives (CAMARA DOS DEPUTADOS, 2009).

9 Floating exchange rate, inflation targets and primary surplus.
sector; (c) avoiding allowance of excessively risky measures by the private sector; and (d) avoiding dogmatism about the duration of the crisis (MESQUITA & TORÔS, 2012).

The level of liquidity was achieved by auctions to sell dollars with repurchase option between October 2008 and February 2009 as well as loans in foreign currency and a program to sell up to US$ 50 billion in exchange rate swap contracts, involving almost 25% of the reserves held at the time. On the internal side, the greater risk aversion created the possibility of a liquidity collapse caused by migration of deposits from small to large banks, also stimulated by the heating of the economy in response to the countercyclical measures and the weakening of the exchange rate. In this case, the BCB and the National Monetary Council (Conselho Monetário Nacional/) focused on reduction of the reserve requirement, portfolio purchase transactions using money from the Credit Guarantee Fund (Fundo Garantidor de Crédito) and extension of the maturities of rediscount transactions. Besides these measures, state-owned banks strongly contributed by increasing the supply of credit, thus removing the liquidity constraint (MESQUITA & TORÔS, 2012).

Likewise, most of the fiscal policy measures did not need articulation of the executive branch with Congress for implementation. These measures included tax relief for some productive sectors (civil construction, automotive, appliances) by reducing the rates of the Tax on Manufactured Products (IPI) and the Tax on Financial Transactions (IOF), along with expansion of credit from the National Bank for Economic and Social Development (BNDES), Banco do Brasil (BB) and Caixa Econômica Federal (CEF), with special spread conditions\(^{10}\). The list was completed with temporary measures for budget transfers, expansion of unemployment insurance coverage and subsidized interest rates for investment in machinery and equipment. Barbosa Filho, then the secretary for economic policy in the Finance Ministry, classified these policies as actions implemented during the crisis with short validity periods (BARBOSA, 2010)\(^{11}\). Further according to him, there were three permanent initiatives adopted during the crisis: changes in the income tax rates for individuals, consolidation of the basic interest rate at a level lower than before the crisis, and creation of the low-income housing program called Minha Casa Minha Vida (“My Home My Life”).

Between October 2008 and March 2009, the executive branch issued nine provisional measures\(^{12}\) related to the 2008 financial crisis, the first three involving regulating actions in the currency market and interventions in the financial market (BRASIL, 2008a, 2008b and 2008c). The others involved different aspects of fiscal policy, such as extension of the time limits for payment of tax debts in installments (BRASIL, 2008d and 2009b), transfers from the National Treasury to the BNDES (BRASIL, 2008e and 2009a), relaxation of the wording of the provisional measure that created the National Sovereign Fund (BRASIL, 2008f), and (considering the time frame of six months from the start of the crisis), the creation of the low-income housing program Minha Casa Minha Vida, the boldest institutional response of the government, which was transformed into law in July 2009 (BRASIL, 2009c).

The sanitary crisis of 2020 and formulation of public policies

The period between the financial and health crisis (2009 to 2019) was initially marked by rapid recovery of the Brazilian economy, which expanded by 7.5% in 2010 after contracting by 0.1% in 2009. However, this was followed by instability and deterioration of the economic and social indicators in Brazil.

In the 2011-2014 period, the first term of President Dilma Rousseff, the economy started to lose dynamism and the public accounts worsened. In 2014, the national unemployment rate was still low, at 7.5% (according to data from the National Household Survey), and even lower in the main metropolitan regions, at only 4.3% (data from the Monthly Employment Survey), as shown in Table 2. Inflation was above 6% in the period and GDP growth in 2014 amounted to 0.5%, with the gross public sector debt rising and the primary surplus of the central government registering negative 0.6% of GDP. The two subsequent years were marked by recession, with GDP retracting by 3.5% and 3.3%, as well as by higher unemployment and deterioration of the public accounts. From the

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10 A critique considering the quantitative results of this policy can be found in Bonomo, Brito and Martins (2015) based on the finding of preferential access given to larger and older companies, deemed to be less risky.

11 Nelson Barbosa also considers the pre-crisis social and economic policies (expansion of the social safety net, increase of the minimum wage, expansion of public investment, tax cuts related to industrial policy, and restructuring the career paths of civil servants) as fundamental to explain the low impact of the crisis in Brazil (BARBOSA, 2010).

12 Provisional measures (medidas provisórias) are presidential decrees with immediate effect, but subject to congressional analysis.
standpoint of fiscal policy, 2016 brought the approval of Constitutional Amendment 95, specifying freezing public spending in real terms for up to 20 years.

Table 2: Evolution of selected indicators for Brazil (2009-2019)

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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP (%)</td>
<td>-0.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>-3.5</td>
<td>-3.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployment (%)*</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>11.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inflation (%)</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Investment/GDP (%)</td>
<td>19.1</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>20.6</td>
<td>20.7</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>15.5</td>
<td>14.6</td>
<td>15.2</td>
<td>15.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gross Debt/GDP**</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>51.8</td>
<td>51.3</td>
<td>53.7</td>
<td>51.5</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>65.5</td>
<td>69.8</td>
<td>73.7</td>
<td>76.5</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Surplus/GDP</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>-0.4</td>
<td>-2.0</td>
<td>-2.6</td>
<td>-1.9</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>-1.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Data from the National Household Survey (PNAD) between 2009 and 2014 (except for 2010, with census data), and the Continuous PNAD between 2015 and 2019 related to the last quarter of each year.
** Data referring to December each year.

The interval from 2017 to 2019 saw timid economic recovery, with GDP growth averaging 1.2% a year and unemployment of 11% in the last quarter of 2019. With respect to the public accounts, Brazil recorded a primary deficit in all years from 2014 and the gross debt reached 75.8% of GDP in December 2019. The pandemic caused by the new coronavirus reached Brazil at a delicate fiscal moment, with an economic team in place leaning toward liberal solutions and low propensity to propose and implement expansionary fiscal policies (and pledging to respect the spending cap imposed by Constitutional Amendment 95).

Then, on January 30, 2020 the World Health Organization declared that COVID-19 was a “public health emergency of international concern”, its highest level of alert, and on February 3rd the Brazilian Ministry of Health issued an edict declaring a national health emergency. The same edict created the Center for Emergency Public Health Operations as the entity responsible for coordinating the nationwide response to the budding crisis (BRASIL, 2020a).

Among the economic measures formulated, the first was a legislative decree of March 20, 2020 recognizing the existence of a state of public calamity, valid until December 31, 2020 (BRASIL, 2020b). Although not an economic measure per se, the decree waived the need to propose and implement expansionary fiscal policies (and pledging to respect the spending cap imposed by Constitutional Amendment 95).

Another relevant fiscal measure was the approval of a supplementary law by Congress on May 4, 2020, establishing measures for financial support to state and municipal governments during 2020 to respond to the COVID-19 crisis and to mitigate the financial effects of the decrease in tax revenues (BRASIL, 2020i). From the monetary policy standpoint, the Central Bank implemented a series of measures aiming to guarantee the liquidity of the National Financial System. The standouts were reduction of the bank reserve requirement from 25% to 18% (BANCO CENTRAL, 2020a) and the program called Working Capital for Preservation of Companies (BRASIL, 2020j; BANCO CENTRAL, 2020b). Also, the executive branch issued a provisional measure allowing the Central Bank to purchase private bonds in the secondary market to provide liquidity in the private credit market (BRASIL, 2020k). Besides these, the Monetary Policy Committee (Copom) of the Central Bank gradually reduced the benchmark interest rate (Selic) from 4.5% (the rate in effect at the time of the national health emergency declaration, on February 3rd) to 2% in August 2020.

With respect to the labor market, a set of policies was formulated to deal with the consequences of the pandemic. On March 22, 2020, the executive branch issued a provisional measure relaxing several requirements of labor law during the state of public calamity, even

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13 The approval of a state of public calamity released the federal government from the obligation to meet the targets set for the primary result. Besides this, it enabled approval of a “war budget” by Congress, allowing the federal government to assume more indebtedness to cover current expenditures due to the pandemic.

14 Other economic measures were implemented in response to the sanitary crisis, such as the release of an extraordinary credit by the executive branch to the ministries of Defense (BRASIL, 2020c), Education and Health (BRASIL, 2020d), the extension of the validity period of the Simples Nacional tax regime for micro and small businesses (BRASIL, 2020e), temporary reduction of the IPI rates on health products related to the pandemic (BRASIL, 2020f), temporary suspension of lawsuits involving delinquent federal tax debts (BRASIL, 2020g) and setting a maximum monthly interest rate on payroll loans to retirees (BRASIL, 2020h).
overriding some constitutional guarantees, in an effort to preserve jobs. Among these were more flexible rules for remote work, advancement of individual and collective vacations and flextime arrangements, to mention a few (BRASIL, 2020i).

Besides the provisions mentioned above, the executive branch issued another provisional measure creating the Emergency Program to Maintain Employment and Income (BRASIL, 2020m). The program involves an emergency benefit, payable in two modalities: (i) proportional to reduction of salary and working hours or (ii) temporary suspension of the employment contract. In both cases, the benefit is calculated based on the monthly amount of unemployment insurance the employee is entitled to receive, and depends on an individual or collective labor agreement. In the first modality, the worker receives a proportion of the unemployment insurance he or she is entitled to receive, in the same proportion as the reduction of the working hours and salary, with validity for up to 90 days15. In the case of suspension of the employment contract, the worker is entitled to receive 100% of the unemployment benefit for a period of up to 60 days.

Another countercyclical protective measure enacted by Congress was the creation of the Emergency Relief Program, on April 2, 2020 (BRASIL, 2020n). This relief initially consisted of payment of R$ 600.00 per month per person for a period of up to three months. Subsequently it was extended for two more months with the same value, and then for three more months (until the end of 2020) with the value reduced to R$ 300.00 a month. This program is widely considered to be the main public policy created to minimize the effects of the sanitary crisis on the income of households and has been studied from several angles. For example Cardoso (2020) investigated the program with respect to its implementation and eligibility, such as previous enrollment on the Cadastro Único (a national database of social programs’ beneficiaries) to receive other government benefits. Freire et al. (2020) studied the impacts of the program on components of GDP and the labor market. With a broader perspective, Carvalho (2020) examined the importance of the functions of the State in crisis moments, while Tavares, Silveira and Paes-Sousa (2020) and Valentim et al. (2020) presented comparative evaluations of the emergency policies implemented in Latin America, with focus on policies to guarantee employment and income. Studies about the consequences of policies involving COVID-19 have also been conducted, such as Pereira, Medeiros and Bertholini (2020).

**Comparative analysis of the formulation of public policies to face the financial and sanitary crises**

The crises of 2008 and 2020 can be interpreted as modern, in the sense of having transboundary nature – geographic (affecting many countries), functional (spreading from one economic sector to others) and time (hard to pin down in time) – as proposed by Boin (2009). Another characteristic that can be added regarding the crises of 2008 and 2020 is the rapid contagion across geographic frontiers due to the financial and physical integration existing in a large part of the globe. The 2008 crisis spread quickly to other countries like Brazil. Only 17 days passed between the failure of Lehman Brothers and the exchange rate reaching R$2.00/US$ in Brazil (the internal threshold adopted in this research) by the authors, as shown in Chart 1. Likewise, only 26 days passed between the emergency declaration by the WHO and the first COVID-19 case in Brazil, suggesting that in Brazil, the external contagion of the financial crisis, by the nature of its propagation, was faster than that of COVID-19.

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15 There are three reductions that can be established in individual agreements between employers and employees, 25%, 50% or 70%. Others are only permitted by collective bargaining agreements.
However, although both episodes can be characterized as modern transboundary crises with high contamination capacity, it is clear that they have very distinct features, thus having different consequences and eliciting different responses by the Brazilian government. The financial crisis of 2008 can be interpreted based on the theory of financial fragility formulated by Minsky (1986). In contexts of economic expansion, agents tend to take risks and leverage themselves excessively, weakening the financial system as a whole. Then all it takes is for a small external shock to unleash a crisis in the financial system, which then contaminates the real side of the economy. In a widespread financial crisis like that of 2008, there is a retraction of private spending for consumption, and especially for investment, due to the uncertainty of financial agents about the future state of the economy. In this context, governments typically implement expansionary fiscal and monetary policies to stimulate aggregate demand and counteract the crisis.

The crisis of 2020 was not generated by any feature of the financial system, but rather by contagion of a previously unknown virus that quickly spread and affected the economy and the labor market. The nature of a pandemic sanitary crisis means that economic policies affecting the demand side are not sufficient to reactivate the economic engines, because not only is private spending affected, but also the capacity of the supply of goods and services, since social isolation prevents people from working. Hence there is a need for measures to: (a) maintain employment, here defined as policies to guarantee the productive capacity of the economy (support with credit lines and increase of the public debt) and (b) emergency income policies, because it is not possible to look for work like in a conventional economic crisis. Besides this, the two crises reached Brazil in two distinct contexts. As shown in Chart 1, the economic/fiscal situation in 2008 was relatively solid and the government had a medium propensity to intervene in the economy. In contrast, the 2020 crisis reached Brazil at a moment of a debilitated economic/fiscal situation, and with a government with low propensity for economic intervention.

Further with respect for the different natures of the crises, it is important to understand their effects on the economy in general and the labor market in particular. Graph 1 suggests that the consequences of the health crisis on the formal labor market have been more accentuated – both in terms of the speed of their effects and their depth. The crisis of 2020 affected the formal labor market almost immediately (considering t=0 to be October 2008 and March 2020) and more strongly than that of 2008. Due to the complex mechanisms for transfer of the crisis from the financial sector to the real side of the economy, the decline in 2008 occurred more acutely, only two months after the start of the crisis. Considering the data on real retail sales in the augmented sense (including automobiles and construction materials), it is possible to observe distinct behavior between the two events. While in 2008 there was a small fluctuation until two months after the internal mark, in 2020 there was a sudden drop at t=0, and worse still at t=1, indicating a possible effect of the social isolation on this sector. The nature of a health crisis suggests a greater impact on commerce than a financial crisis, precisely because of the social isolation. The recovery of commerce in 2020 has so far been V-shaped, which might have been related to the creation of the Program to Maintain

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Financial crisis (2008)</td>
<td>Failure of Lehman Brothers (September 15, 2008)</td>
<td>Depreciation of the exchange rate (October 2, 2008)</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Good</td>
<td>Medium</td>
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<tr>
<td>Health crisis (2020)</td>
<td>WHO public health emergency declaration (January 30, 2020)</td>
<td>1st recorded case of COVID-19 (February 25, 2020)</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Deteriorated</td>
<td>Low</td>
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Source: Authors’ elaboration.
Employment and Income and the Emergency Relief Program. Besides this, the recovery also might have been affected by the resumption of in-person activities, since the rules on shutting down economic activities were mainly determined by state governors, with heterogeneous behavior regarding timing and affected sectors.

**Graph 1:** Indicators of the Formal Labor Market and Real Retail Sales (augmented) – 2020 and 2008

![Graph Image](image_url)

- **Balance labor 2020**
- **Balance labor 2008**
- **Index retail sales 2020**
- **Index retail sales 2008**

**Obs.:** The index in the augmented sense includes construction materials and automobiles. The retail data are seasonally adjusted. The monthly balance corresponds to the new hiring minus dismissals. To facilitate visualization, t=0 October 2008 and March 2020, respectively.

Sources: Monthly Commerce Survey (PMC) from the IBGE and General List if Hiring and Dismissal (CAGED).

Because of the distinct natures of the crises, the public policies implemented in 2008 put greater emphasis on support to companies, such as their access to credit, and the safety of the financial system. The idea behind supporting companies was that they would maintain employment levels and indirectly benefit households. In 2020, there also has been support to companies and the financial system, but these have been accompanied by the Program to Maintain Employment and Income and the Emergency Relief Program, as direct consequences of the need for social isolation.

Another framework to characterize the response to crises derives from the proposal of Ronconi et al. (2010), with two axes for analysis of public policies in the context of crisis. On one axis, the policies are classified as new or based on existing policies, while on the other they are ranked according to time frame, from temporary to permanent, i.e., to deal with the effects in the short run or to establish permanent policy changes by using windows of opportunity.

In reaction to the consequences of the 2008 crisis, most of the policies implemented were based on existing instruments and were transitory, although used with greater intensity due to the gravity of the crisis (expansion of credit from state-owned banks, intervention in the foreign exchange market, etc.). The cases classified as “structural” changes achieved by taking advantage of the windows of opportunity opened by the crisis (KINGDON, 2005) were the *Minha Casa Minha Vida* program, the targeted tax relief measures and the gradual reduction of the basic interest rate, which were considered “permanent” because they outlasted the crisis period, although over the long run they were subject to discontinuities.

In turn, in the sanitary crisis, two of the main policies formulated – the Program to Maintain Employment and Income and the Emergency Relief Program – are emergency responses and in principle are temporary. On the one hand, it is possible to assume the creation of these programs has been the product of the unprecedented challenges posed by the health crisis and the insufficiency of existing instruments, which required implementing new policies to face the crisis. On the other hand,
the emergency imposed by the pandemic has required even new policies to use existing capacities and instruments (CARDOSO, 2020). An example is the Emergency Relief Program, which although being considered a new policy formulated to deal with the crisis, formally is a modification of the Benefício de Prestação Continuada (a cash transfer program for the elderly and persons with disabilities) (BPC) and was only possible because of the existence of the Cadastro Único. At this writing, there has been no definition of whether or not the Emergency Relief will be made permanent. In any event, it has had a positive impact on the president’s popularity, opening possibilities of continuity or creation of another income transfer program to replace Bolsa Família (PROGRAMA, 2020).

Final Considerations

The objective of this article is to present a comparative analysis of the economic policies established in Brazil in reaction to the financial crisis of 2008 and the health crisis of 2020. More specifically, we discuss to what extent the existence of a crisis, its nature, the economic context and the government’s propensity to intervene in the economy influence the process of formulating public policies, based on a review of the theoretical literature on crises and public policies and analysis of the policies formulated in reaction to the two crises.

Our main results indicate that in the 2008 financial crisis, most of the policies formulated originated from existing policies and were temporary, the exceptions being Minha Casa Minha Vida and the targeted tax relief measures. Besides this, the actions were more centralized in the executive branch. In contrast, in 2020 the most important policies have been new (Program to Maintain Employment and Income and Emergency Relief Program) and temporary, with contradictory incorporation of the executive branch and active participation of Congress, which had been occurring even before the crisis, such as for reform of the pension system.

Based on the theoretical discussion about crises and public policies, it is possible to consider that both crises had sufficient magnitude, as framed by Kingdon (2005), to be considered focusing events, opening windows of opportunity, classifying them as public problems and including policies to deal with the crises on the agenda for decisions.

Although a current in the literature contends that governments are rarely able to manage crises and achieve major reforms at the same time (BOIN & 'T HART, 2003), this apparently happened in 2008, with some permanent changes, such as Minha Casa Minha Vida, a policy that was simultaneously countercyclical and served to meet a social demand, and was not an obvious instrument to deal with the consequences of a financial crisis. This is possibly related to the greater propensity of the Lula administration to intervene in the economy, as well as an internal and external economic environment before the crisis that was relatively favorable. Hence, it was a solution looking for a problem (COHEN, MARCH & OLSEN, 1972). In contrast, in 2020 the hypothesis of Boin and ‘T Hart (2003) seems more consistent. While on the one hand, a substantial fiscal expansion has occurred, with creation of new programs to deal with the crisis, on the other it is possible to argue that the adverse economic context – with the spending cap rule being a synthetic indicator – and the low propensity of the federal government to intervene in the economy has limited the future expansion of public spending. The relaxation of the fiscal rule was not proposed by either the executive branch or Congress, so the chances of the new policies’ becoming permanent are low. Therefore, by including the economic/fiscal dimension in the analysis, it is possible to suggest that large reforms occur in contexts of crisis when the government has medium/high propensity to intervene in the economy in a favorable fiscal context. Otherwise, crisis situations will not engender the creation of permanent policies that require raising public spending.

Although this article is focused on the formulation of emergency actions, it is important to briefly consider the evaluation of these policies – with the advantage of hindsight about the 2008 crisis. It was marked by autarchic action of the executive branch with the use of a well-established repertoire of interventions and the implementation of permanent policies. The measures implemented unequivocally hastened the recovery of the Brazilian economy. Since the economy presented signs of loss of dynamism and aggravation of the public accounts and inflation starting in 2012, the diagnosis suggested by Carvalho (2018) can be considered correct, since these more recent results have little to do with the measures adopted during the crisis. Instead, the culprits were the actions taken as of 2011 and the reversal of the favorable international scenario. In the case of the 2020 crisis, the Emergency Relief was contradictorily appropriated by the president and required mobilization of other political actors to urge even more substantial expenditures, providing
reasonable protection of a significant contingent of the population during the worst phase of the pandemic. Nevertheless, unlike in 2008, the final balance does not look to be auspicious: although the projections indicate that the economy has contracted less than initially envisioned, after the passage of six months no actions have been constructed indicating worry about intensive economic growth. Furthermore, the death toll – over 150 thousand as of this writing – reveals that the contradictory movement of the government has overstepped the economic field and entered the graveyard.

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